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An Environmental Competition Statute
David M. Driesen, University Professor
Syracuse University
The previous part has been concerned primarily with conserving our
environmental legacy. Environmental law, however, must function not only as a force
for conservation of the good, but also as the generator of a better future. Next generation
environmental law embraces both preservation and dynamic and constructive change.
Thus, the next generation of environmental law must figure out how to generate the sorts
of changes that will create a better environmental future.
The next generation of environmental law should use economic incentives to
creatively stimulate innovation in environmental technology. This chapter proposes an
Environmental Competition Statute as a means of stimulating movement toward a more
sustainable future. Such a statute would authorize those who achieve low emissions to
collect the cost of achieving low emissions plus a premium from competitors with higher
emissions.
This chapter briefly explains the value of using this mechanism. It then canvasses
the problems with first and second generation of environmental law that the
Environmental Competition Statute can help us overcome. A detailed description of the
Environmental Competition Statute follows. The chapter then turns to possible
objections to the scheme not addressed in the previous material. It closes with a brief
conclusion.
Value of an Environmental Competition Statute
We have achieved a number of advances in material welfare because
entrepreneurs seek to get rich by developing and introducing innovations. Examples
include the cellular phone, the personal computer, and various uses of the internet.
Innovators’ ability to gain market share through productive change is limited only by
their imagination and capabilities in meeting potential demand. Unfortunately, the free
market rarely encourages innovations improving the environment, because they usually
benefit the public as a whole, rather than particular consumers paying for favorable
environmental changes.1
An Environmental Competition Statute has the potential to encourage contests to
improve environmental quality comparable to the ongoing competition to realize other
sorts of improvements. It aims to allow the capabilities of innovators free reign in
improving environmental quality. It makes it possible for anybody reducing pollution to
realize a profit from doing so.
The statute also creates risks for those who fail to advance and innovate,
comparable to the risks faced by non-innovators in competitive markets for nonenvironmental goods and services. Just as makers of mainframe computers must adapt to
1
See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 98-102 (2003) (discussing
the private market’s limitations in encouraging innovation protecting the environment)
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the threat posed by PCs, or risk losing market share, those who fail to adopt the latest
environmental technology should lose money to faster moving competition. This statute
allows environmental innovators to prosper at the expense of environmental laggards,
thereby allowing environmental markets to function like other competitive markets. In
short, an Environmental Competition Statute encourages competition to improve the
environment.
Problems with the Existing Law
Most existing law allows the government officials’ timidity to limit our
environmental achievements.2 The law authorizes federal and state officials to limit the
amount of pollution facilities can emit. The officials administering these laws usually
must take the costs our most antiquated industry must face into account in thinking about
mandating environmental change.3 They rarely, however, actively consider the economic
benefits those with newer technologies might realize from substantial positive
environmental change when establishing new standards.4 As a result, even when
modernization would generate new jobs and greatly improve the environment,
government regulations only rarely demand significant changes in approach.
Government officials often feel obliged when setting standards for an entire
industry to make sure that every company in an industry can meet the standards it sets.5
While the law authorizes and sometimes requires regulations based on the achievements
of the best performers,6 government officials tend to avoid aggressive regulation because
of the political problems that tough standards would create7. While in other areas
competition tends to make the best performers the trend setters, in environmental law,
laggards have a big influence on the quality of environmental performance.
This feeling of obligation and pressure from the judiciary leads to standards not
reflecting the full capabilities industry possesses to improve environmental performance.8
Government officials often base their regulations on the technical capabilities of pollution
2

See ID. at 112-22 (discussing the structure and economic dynamics of government decision-making in
detail).
3
See, e.g., National Renderers Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding a
water pollution rule arbitrary, because EPA did not adequately consider whether costs would
affect the economic viability of medium-sized facilities).
4
Cf. MIGUEL MENDONCA, FEED-IN TARIFFS: ACCELERATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF RENEWABLENUCLEAR
ENERGY 43 (2007) (Germany’s feed-in tariff system to encourage renewable energy created job growth in
the renewable energy sector).
5
See, e.g., National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing a performance
standard, because EPA could not adequately show that its limited data adequately took into account
operational variables throughout the industry). 2000) (remanding because EPA ignored statutory
commands in order to show that all sources can achieve the standards set under the most adverse
conditions).
6
See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(3).
7
See, e.g., National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (remanding because EPA
ignored statutory commands in order to show that all sources can achieve the standards set under the most
adverse conditions).
8
See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.
J. 1385 (1992).
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control technology. Government officials often, however, have limited knowledge of
industry capabilities to improve environmental performance. As a result, they tend to
demand relatively modest improvement based on well-understood technology. This has
been the case, to some degree, even under statutory provisions designed to force
technology.9
The judiciary plays a role in exacerbating this problem, because industry regularly
litigates to challenge rules limiting their pollution. Government officials know that
courts can block implementation of their rules if judges find the rules unreasonable.10
While the relevant statutes only authorize reversal of arbitrary and capricious
discretionary decisions, courts sometimes give rules a very “hard look.” Because
officials cannot predict precisely how courts will apply the rather vague standards
governing judicial review of agency rules, they tend to shy away from stringent
requirements unless they have very good information indicating that facilities have
known techniques available for meeting them.11
Many policy-makers associate this problem of government regulation failing to
encourage substantial innovation with command-and-control regulation. But this timidity
problem also limits the achievements of emissions trading programs. Emissions trading
programs require government officials to set limits on the amount of pollution polluting
facilities emit.12 The emissions trading law then authorizes polluters subject to those
limits to avoid them if they purchase equivalent extra reductions from other facilities,
which makes it possible to meet bureaucratically chosen limits efficiently. Government
officials develop these limits with the costs to old established industry of making changes
very much in mind. They therefore usually make demands that do not require basic
technological changes significantly improving societal welfare. For example, Title IV of
9

David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation: The
Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 14-16
(2005) (explaining how judicial demands for a rational basis for technology-based rules have limited
capacity to force technological innovation).
Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV.
771, 805-31 (1977) (contending that judicial requirements that agency identify at least one technology
capable of achieving its promulgated standards limited agencies’ ability to force technology); Cf. Note,
Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L. J. 1713, 1718-19 (1979) (claiming that
state plans did force some technological improvement) .
10
See generally Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1243 (1999).
12
See Michael Grubb, et al., Allowance Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme: A
Commentary, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 127, 127 (2005) (describing the “allocation of allowances” as “the most . . .
important step” for “any emissions trading system”); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic
Incentive Program?: Beyond the Economic Incentive/Command and Control Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 289, 324 (1998);Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing
the need for limits as a “necessary aspect” of “any” emissions trading program).
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the Clean Air Act includes a very well designed emissions trading program for sources of
sulfur dioxide causing acid rain. This program has produced some of the reductions
needed to address the ecological problems acid rain causes, but it has not encouraged
substantial movements toward modern renewable energy technologies.13 Rather, it has
encouraged traditional end-of-the-pipe controls (scrubbers) and some modest pollution
prevention (low sulfur coal).14 The acid rain program has not made the purveyors of the
most promising innovative environmental technologies rich. So, it has not functioned to
produce the kind of wide open competition that has enriched people with new ideas
providing material benefits to consumers.15
The same problem of government timidity would limit the efficacy of pollution
taxes. Economists support pollution taxes as an efficient environmental protection
instrument. If the traditional U.S. antipathy toward taxes ever abated sufficiently to allow
a pollution tax law to pass at all, government officials would have to choose the tax rates
to apply to pollution. They would probably find it politically difficult to set rates
sufficiently high to stimulate significant innovation in environmentally friendly
technologies.
Existing law does not provide a continuous incentive to innovate and go beyond
compliance.16 Even in an emissions trading program, once an operator of a facility has
met government set pollution limits, by purchasing credits from over-complying plants or
through local reductions, no incentive exists to go further.17 Because of this limited
demand for credits, only a limited incentive exists to overcomply; rational polluters will
only produce as many credits as non-complying facilities need to achieve compliance, not
more. The incentive to improve environmental performance lasts only until the
compliance deadline comes up. Emissions trading provides no incentives for net
reductions beyond those envisioned by government officials, who set caps with limited
information about private sector capacity for innovation. Proponents of emissions trading
often assert that government officials can remedy the lack of incentive for continuous
innovation by setting new limits that apply after a compliance deadline expires. But
setting new limits can be politically difficult. Industry can avoid cost by opposing fresh

13

See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 130 (2000)
See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVT’L L. REP. 10094,
10105 (2003); Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade Should Replace Rate
Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVT’L L. REP. 10330, 10332 (2001) (describing scrubbers and low
sulfur coal as the principal compliance techniques).
15
Cf. Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin, and David A. Hounshell, Regulation as the Mother of
Invention: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 L. & POL’Y 348, 370 (2005) (finding less innovation under the acid
rain program than under the command and control regime preceding it); David Popp, Pollution Control
Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 641 (2003) (finding more
patenting of environmental technology under command and control than under the acid rain trading
program, but finding a different type of innovation under trading).
16
See Driesen, supra note 11, at 10099-10101 (explaining in detail why a trading program fails to provide
continuous incentives for environmental improvement); Driesen, supra note 9, at 324-327 (same).
17
See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from
an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 8-9 & n. 33 (1991) (recognizing that emissions trading tends to reach an
equilibrium).
14
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limits, and frequently does.18 Because government responses to the pressures they face
are unpredictable, government regulation, whether by emissions trading or conventional
approaches, does not provide a secure climate for investment and deployment of
innovative environmental technologies, even though it has secured some significant
incremental improvement and occasional innovations.19
A tax program would provide a continuous reduction incentive, but only for a
limited class of innovation, those with marginal costs less than the marginal tax rate.
Taxes would not provide good incentives for important cutting edge technologies that
would require significant investments putting their marginal costs above marginal tax
rates, even if such investments would lower costs and improve environmental quality in
the long run.
The Environmental Competition Statute arises from experience with second
generation economic incentives. These incentives fall into two categories, negative
incentives that penalize pollution, such as pollution taxes, and positive incentives that
reward pollution reductions, such as subsidies. The law, however, functions most
dynamically when negative economic incentives fund positive economic incentives.
Governments occasionally enacted or considered such programs during the second
generation of environmental law. Thus, New Zealand imposed licensing fees on fishing,
a negative economic incentive, and used the revenue from these fees to pay fishermen to
retire, a positive economic incentive.20 France taxed water pollution and used some of
the revenue to fund wastewater treatment. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, an
emissions trading program, probably will auction off emission allowances, and states
may use these revenues to fund energy efficiency improvements.21 The California
legislature considered a program, Drive +, that would impose fees upon consumers
purchasing energy inefficient vehicles and give those fees to consumers purchasing

18

Accord Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law:
Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L. J. 1329, 1359 (1996) (noting the pressures that
bureaucrats face to overallocate allowances in a trading scheme); see, e.g., Inho Choi, Global Climate
Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading and an Analysis of the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the
Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 902-03 (2005) (describing California’s RECLAIM
program as a failure because caps were set too high); Axel Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU
Emissions Trading: Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 5 (2005) (explaining
how lobbying in the EU lead to goals in phase one of its emissions trading scheme providing for little
departure from “business as usual” levels of carbon emissions); Grubb et al., supra note 9, at 132-33
(same); Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving a claim to
additional emission allowances); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 58 F.3d 643, 647 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (same); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. 25 F.3d 526, 526 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Mononganhela Power
Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.3d 272, 272-74 (4th Cir. 1992)
19
See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt’l L.
Inst.) 10094, 10103-10105 (2003).
20
See Tom Tietenberg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain our Environment, 33 CHALLENGE 42, 43
(1990).
21
See David M. Driesen, The Changing Climate for United States Law, 1 CLIMATE CHANGE L. REV. 33, 38
(2007) (discussing movement toward auctioning under RGGI).
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energy efficient vehicles as a rebate.22 And finally, New Hampshire officials considered
an Industry Average Performance System that would redistribute pollution taxes to low
polluting companies. The Environmental Competition Statute seeks to build on these
cutting edge second generation reforms to stimulate increased innovation.
Increased innovation is important, because innovation increases our capacity to
address environmental problems over time and can reduce the cost of doing so. Yet
economists recognize that markets generally stimulate insufficient innovation. The
reason for this is that developers of innovation cannot capture all of the benefits
innovation creates for society. These positive spillovers (benefits not generating rents for
the innovator) arise because innovations can contribute knowledge that spurs additional
innovation by competitors.23 These observations about markets’ limits in spurring
innovation apply to the markets that first generation performance standards create and to
the markets that second generation emissions trading programs create. The value of
innovation and the limits of markets in encouraging suggest the need for creative
measures to stimulate innovation, such as the Environmental Competition Statute.
A Description of an Environmental Competition Statute
An Environmental Competition Statutes aims to stimulate a race to the top, a
competition to develop and deploy environmentally superior technology. In order to
stimulate this race an Environmental Competition Statute authorizes those producing
products or services with low emissions to collect fees from competitors with higher
emissions. These fees should be sufficient to fund the full cost of using and developing
an environmentally superior approach and also provide a premium above that amount.
Thus, the law would have two components. First, it would set out a requirement that a
relatively high polluter must pay any low polluting competitor requesting a fee a dollar
amount equal to the amount the low polluting competitor spent to achieve lower
emissions than the high polluter. The low polluter could demand this fee from any
higher polluting competitor it chooses. Second, the legislation would set out a premium
that the high polluter must pay beyond the low polluter’s cost. For example, the law
could require that upon demand any polluter with higher emissions than the competing
company making the demand must pay the low polluter the cost it incurred to achieve
low emissions plus 10% of its abatement costs.
This approach would allow environmental markets to emulate the economic
dynamics of highly competitive markets. In such markets, firms innovate in order to take
market share from other firms. When they innovate successfully, they in effect take
money from their competitors, as their revenues increase and their competitors revenues
22

Nathaniel Greene and Venessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right: Incentives for Cleaner, More
Efficient Vehicles, 12 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 289, 346 (1998).
23
See Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation and Intellectual Property Innovation: A
New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMPLE J. ENVTL. L. & TECH. 51, 56 (2006) (if a person “builds a better
mousetrap,” others may copy it); RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 123-24 (2004)
(third parties’ ability to use information makes it difficult for inventors to keep all the value their inventions
create). See generally Brett Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
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diminish. The Environmental Competition Statute’s transfer payment scheme creates this
same effect for environmental goods.
Absent such a statute, environmental markets do not produce freewheeling
competition for market share to fully meet consumer demand for environmental goods.
Consumers want environmental benefits, but because these benefits are public goods,
consumers cannot purchase them in free markets. Thus, I may want clean air, but I
cannot pay anybody to produce it. No one party can provide me with clean air, because
dirty air comes about as a result of the actions of multiple actors, all or most of whom
must cleanup to produce clean air. This public character of environmental goods (and
bads) distinguishes them from private goods, like an air conditioner, that one can
purchase from a single party.
Government regulation serves to stimulate provision of the public good of
environmental quality. But it does so through a less dynamic mechanism than
competition to seize market share. It creates a demand for a discrete governmentmandated environmental improvement, which can, as we have seen, be inadequate and
insufficiently take advantage of private sector capacity to produce environmental
improvements.
The kind of economic dynamic the environmental competition statute provides is
powerful. It uses fear and greed to motivate innovation, combining an opportunity for
profit for innovators, and a risk of loss for those who fail to innovate as quickly as their
competitors. By doing this, it allows environmental law to emulate the most widely
admired feature of free markets, its tendency to simulate technological advances bettering
our lives. Free markets in private goods likewise depend upon fear and greed to motivate
technological advancements. Opportunities for profit and fear of loss stimulate the risk
taking that must occur in order to create significant technological advances.
Absent such a statute, each polluter often must internalize (pay for) the cost of
pollution control itself. But it may externalize (pass on to others) the costs of pollution—a
degraded environment and serious public health problems. This asymmetry discourages
cleanup. An Environmental Competition Statute allows polluters to systematically
externalize the costs of pollution control, just as polluters now can externalize pollutions’
costs. This cost externalization frees them to employ all their ingenuity to cleanup.
Sound principles support the idea of an Environmental Competition Statute. In
confronting environmental problems, we should “Do the Best We Can.”24 Too often,
however, we settle for mediocre environmental standards, standards that demand some
improvement, but not nearly as much as the market is capable of delivering. This statute
tends to foster technological progress by letting the leading edge innovators set the pace.
Just as in a market for consumer goods and services, a firm must keep up with what the

24

See A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A PROJECT OF THE
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 57-70 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds. 2004)
(disussing this concept as a principal to guide environmental law).
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best firms are doing or lose money, this statute likewise requires firms to match the
achievements of their best environmental competitors or risk financial consequences.
This statute allows firms to profit from environmental leadership and encourages them to
truly do the best they can in advancing environmental quality.
An Environmental Competition Statute also helps overcome problems inherent in
the economic dynamics of regulation. Frequently, firms resist regulation en masse and
all regulated firms share an interest in defeating enforcement. Since we all finance firms’
anti-environmental litigation and lobbying when we purchase the goods they make, they
have a lot of resources to use in thwarting progress. An Environmental Competition
Statute should make about half of the polluting firms into enforcers of the statute. It
promises distinct economic benefits to the cleanest firms, which may lead some firms to
support such a statute. In these ways, an Environmental Competition Statute seeks to
overcome the economic dynamics at the heart of regulatory failure to keep pace with
environmentally destructive activities.25
The legislature may make the obligation to pay low pollution competitors a
general requirement for all classes of pollutants and industries or may instead focus on a
particular industry and set of pollutants of concern. Congress (or a state legislature)
could, for example, enact an Environmental Competition Statutes focusing on all emitters
of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas causing global warming. The
owner of a new solar plant (for example) could collect all of the costs of plant
construction from owners of existing power plants with higher emissions plus a premiuma dollar amount written into the legislation to provide a profit margin for each low
emitter. Similarly, makers of vehicles with low carbon dioxide emissions could demand
that the makers of vehicles with higher emissions pay the additional costs associated with
making their vehicles lower emitting.
Congress (or a state legislature) could enact an Environmental Competition
Statute without amending any existing law. It would be a means of supplementing basic
obligations with incentives to go beyond those obligations, or of encouraging new efforts
where little has been done (e.g. global warming).
The legislation, however, would function best if it addressed some matters of
detail. The legislation might define the pollutants and/or industries it applies to. It would
be important to define the industry in terms of broad functions, (e.g. the personal vehicle
transportation industry), not specific market niches (e.g. sports utility vehicle makers).
The whole point is to force transfer payments between companies based on
environmental performance in meeting basic consumer needs. This requires
identification of the bounds of an industry, since only competitors must pay a low
polluting firm under this approach. Since consumers buying cars have a choice between
25

See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 113-135 (analyzing the dynamics of this failure in detail).Cf. DAVID
GOLDSTEIN, SAVING ENERGY GROWING JOBS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROMOTES ECONOMIC
GROWTH, PROFITABILITY, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITION,172-76 (2007) (explaining how trade
associations repress competition to profit from environmental protection and pressure the government to
adopt weak standards or none at all).

8

sedans and Sports Utility Vehicles, for example, defining a category to include all forms
of personal transportation makes sense.
This legislation will be most helpful in areas where we anticipate the need for
very significant technological change. Climate change is such an area. Scientists suggest
that we will need more than a 50% cut in global emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 in
order to avoid dangerous climate change.26 Because developing countries emissions are
expected to rise during most of this period, this may require cuts of 80% or more in
developed country emissions. Since carbon dioxide emissions constitute about 80% of
the gases on warming potential basis, this implies a massive move away from fossil fuels.
Such a move will require massive technological changes. Other areas may also benefit
from such an approach.
An Environmental Competition Statute will have to provide some guidance about
how to compare the emissions of competing firms. The measurement issue is not
fundamentally different from issues in traditional regulation, where we also must figure
out how to measure emissions and fairly take into account differences among firms. But
in the context of environmental competition, we may profitably treat some of the issues a
little differently than we have in other contexts.
An important aspect of the measurement problem involves the choice of a metric
upon which to base comparisons. A mass-based metric will not work terribly well in this
context. Suppose for example, that one power plant generates 100 tons of carbon dioxide
per year and another generates 200 tons of carbon dioxide per year. One might think that
it would be appropriate to consider the 200 ton facility as the facility with higher
emissions and allow the 100 ton facility to collect fees from the 200 ton facility. This
might, however, be inappropriate. Suppose that the 200 ton facility provides electricity to
a million people and the 100 ton facility provides electricity to just one thousand people.
It does not seem fair, in such a situation, to consider the larger facility the higher emitter
just because it is big and supplies a lot of customers. A better metric would be tons of
carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour per year. This would normalize emissions by the
amount of pollution per unit of output. In general, this should be the approach. We
should measure and compare emissions by the mass of emissions generated annually per
unit of output.
Another threshold issue involves deciding whether to focus on emission levels or
emission reductions. This issue too, has its counterparts in existing regulatory programs.
Regulators setting a traditional first generation performance standard can focus on future
emission reductions, by demanding even percentage reductions from firms, meaning that
clean firms must clean up just as much as dirty firms (in percentage terms) to escape
26
See James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope: How Much Global Warming Constitutes “Dangerous
Anthropogenic Interference, 68 CLIMATE CHANGE 269, 277 (2005) (stating that a 2°C temperature rise
“almost surely takes us well into the realm of dangerous” climate change); Malte Meinshausen, What Does
a 2°C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission
Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE
CHANGE 269-270 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al. eds. (2006) (estimating that limiting temperature rise
to less than 2°C likely requires a 55% reduction below 1990 emission levels by 2050)
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liability. Alternatively, it can set absolute uniform emission limits, which would require
significant reductions in firms with high baseline emissions, but much fewer reductions
(or none at all) from relatively clean plants.27 An Environmental Competition Statute
likewise could use levels as the trigger for liability, authorizing low emitters to collect
payments form high emitters. Alternatively, the statute could employ an emissions
reduction approach, basing payments on relative amounts of emission reductions after the
program was enacted. For reasons that appear below, a properly designed emissions
level approach functions much better than the emission reduction approach.
The emissions level approach maximizes pressure on dirty plants to clean-up. It
makes them immediately vulnerable to demands for payment, even without their cleaner
competitors undertaking any new projects, because dirty plants will, at the outset, have
more emissions than clean ones. If this approach is used, the statute should give plants a
few years before any demands for payment can be made to give owners of relatively dirty
plants a chance to clean up to escape fee payment obligations.
An emission reduction approach works less well, because it may grandfather in
existing emissions. Under this approach a very dirty coal-fired power plant could reduce
emissions and claim a penalty from a natural gas power plant that produced fewer
emission reductions, even if the gas-fired power plant has lower emission levels (since
gas is inherently cleaner than coal). It minimizes economic dynamic pressure for
fundamental technological changes (like fuel choices) and maximizes fairness to existing
polluters. It fails to force significant change, because it accepts the status quo baseline as
a given. Worse, in some contexts, it can reward dirty facilities at the expense of clean
competition. For example, under this approach, an existing coal-fired power plant could
reduce its emissions slightly and then collect the cost of doing that from a zero emission
solar facility, which cannot reduce its emissions (since it’s impossible to go below zero
emissions). Where such perverse outcomes are likely, the emission reduction approach
should not be used. By contrast, an emissions level approach maximizes pressures for
environmental advances.
Just like emissions trading, pollution taxes, and performance standards, an
environmental competition statute relies on accurate monitoring and reporting of
pollution levels. The Environmental Competition Statute, like other economic incentivebased approaches, will work best in contexts where reliable monitoring or estimation is
feasible. Provisions in the statute should require the use of the best monitoring
techniques available. In addition, polluters must report their pollution, not just to the
government, but to their competitors. This reporting will make it possible for
competitors to compare emissions for the sake of planning environmental improvements
to avoid fees and for the sake of deciding who to seek fees from after a low pollution
level is achieved. The reporting should take the form of regular postings on an internet
page accessible to all. Since the statute should be based on comparisons of pollution per
unit of output level, the reporting should cover both emissions and production numbers.

27

See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 193-95 (discussing the differences between percentage reduction and fixed
level standards)
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Environmental Competition Statutes will have to define competitive markets for
the sake of establishing who may collect fees from whom. Existing environmental law
generally regulates polluters in an industry category, often defined by standard industrial
classification (SIC) codes. SIC codes, however, do not fully describe competitors in a
system designed to reward environmentally friendly innovation and apply negative
economic incentives to dirtier means of meeting the same consumer goal. In some cases,
SIC codes will be too narrow and in some cases too broad. Ideally, someone who
develops a system of integrated pest management (IPM), for example, that makes it
possible to increase crop yields with little or no pesticide use, should be able to collect a
payment from pesticide manufacturers that compete with her to increase crop yields.
Even if the IPM developers operate a research farm and the pesticide manufacturer
operates a pesticide plant, the statute should regard them as competitors (or allow courts
to develop a common law of competition based on broad principles).
The application of the statute to a well-defined group of polluters with very clear
specific definitions of competitors would minimize disputes about who is a competitor.
But broader definitions of competitors would produce much more innovation and
fundamental change in how we deliver goods and services to consumers.
The legislation should forbid communication among competitors about how firms
plan to respond to the Environmental Competition Statute. Otherwise, they might agree
to do nothing, thereby eliminating the incentives to compete. Violation of these
provisions should carry very heavy penalties, including jail terms for individuals
committing deliberate violations. Such communication should be regarded as proof of a
conspiracy to prevent environmental competition in violation of anti-trust principles.
Absent such conspiracies, some companies with advanced environmental capabilities will
likely seize the opportunity to extract payments from competitors, thereby starting the
race to the top. Firms who do not view themselves as environmentally advanced may
start beefing up their emission reducing activities out of fear of becoming a target.
The legislation should also seek to minimize litigation by providing a dispute
settlement mechanism, perhaps through mandatory arbitration. Disputes may arise about
who is a competitor and who has the lowest emissions. Those using continuous
monitoring should be presumed to have lower emissions than competitors, unless the
competitor can prove otherwise. This will encourage reliable monitoring. Still,
legitimate disputes about how to estimate or measure emissions may arise. So, it is
desirable to see to it that these quarrels do not become so time consuming as to blunt the
program’s effects. On the other hand, actions to reduce pollution in order to get transfer
payments or to avoid having to become a payer of one can prove productive even if final
settlement is delayed.
An Environmental Competition Statute will not generate complicated
environmentally fruitless disputes. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, otherwise known as Superfund, has a reputation
for generating vexing disputes. This United States federal law makes a variety of parties
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associated with a toxic waste site responsible for that sites cleanup. This has often led to
protracted disputes about how to apportion liability among potentially responsible parties.
Superfund, however, has been a notable success in encouraging parties not to
create new toxic waste dumps since its enactment in 1980.28 An Environmental
Competition Statute would likely stimulate a comparable scramble to avoid liability.
The principle causes of protracted disputes and high transaction costs under
Superfund would not exist under an Environmental Competition Statute. Allocating
responsibility under Superfund has proven difficult because obtaining good information
about the past history of toxic waste dumps (who dumped, who allowed dumping, etc.)
has proven difficult and the program creates great uncertainty about the eventual
cleanup’s scope. By contrast, the Environmental Competition Statute will apply to
facilities where the responsibility for pollution clearly belongs with the owner of the
facility. It usually will not prove difficult to determine pollution levels, because pollution
is ongoing, not past, and liability will only arise after cleanup is completed and
documented and the costs completely known. Furthermore, one can structure an
Environmental Competition Statute to limit the parties involved to as few as two—one
defendant and one plaintiff, thus avoiding the multiparty litigation that has bedeviled the
Superfund program.
Concerns Such a Statute May Raise
Competition offers great prospects for gains and advancements. But it also
involves change. And change can excite fear.
While an environmental competition statute may increase jobs in companies
employing new low emission approaches, it can conceivably cause job losses and even
bankruptcy in high pollution companies. In other areas of life, we accept occasional job
losses as the price to pay for improvement. Hence, nobody argues that we should throttle
the personal computer to stave off job losses in the typewriter industry. If we accept
these sorts of consequences as the price of progress in delivering better consumer goods
or services, we should accept them, when necessary, as a sometimes necessary cost of
environmental progress.
Congress (or a state legislature) could, however, seek to protect workers from
some of competition’s potential consequences, just as it has protected workers from the
consequences of some other market-based environmental measures. When Congress
enacted the acid rain trading program, it recognized that the flexibility this program
offered electric utilities would probably lead to more use of low sulfur coal. While this
was good for miners in regions producing low sulfur coal it was not good for miners in
regions producing high sulfur coal. Decreased demand for high sulfur coal could lead to
28
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job losses in the regions producing it. Accordingly, Congress provided transitional
assistance to high sulfur coal miners when it passed the acid rain program.
If Congress wishes to protect workers from the consequences of competition,
however, the legislation providing this protection should reach all form of competition,
not just environmental competition. If we wish to have a more humane policy with
respect to the disruptions a competitive economy gives rise to in peoples’ lives, it should
be a broad form of protection that helps workers hurt by all sorts of market change, not
just that produced by environmental laws creating competitive market dynamics.
When an Environmental Competition targets one form of pollution, those
reducing or eliminating the target pollutant may respond with measures that create
different risks than the statute targeted. This problem is not unique to the Environmental
Competition Statute; it arises under first and second generation programs as well. Still,
regulators should anticipate problems that might arise under such a statute. For example,
if they do not wish to encourage payments from coal-fired power plant operators to
nuclear power plants, because of the risks involved in nuclear power, they should draft
provisions prohibiting that. Unanticipated problems, however, can arise in any program
that affords industry technological choices. 29
The Environmental Competition Statute I have outlined lacks a clear cost
constraint. Under the pure form of this approach sketched above, clean producers can
collect the cost of their cleanliness from dirty competitors no matter how costly the clean
approach happened to be. A lack of cost constraint may be useful when addressing
extremely serious problems that require substantial innovation, like global warming.
In practice, however, such a statute would not produce entirely unconstrained
costs.30 Producers seeking to introduce cleaner processes must make sure that those
processes are not so expensive as to bankrupt them. If they go bankrupt, they are not a
competitor who can claim compensation for cleanup. They also must spend money
before they collect it and some risk exists that their competition may cleanup as well, so
there remains some risk in spending too much without realizing sufficient improvements
to collect from a competitor with some financial capability to make the required
payments. Even though these economic constraints will apply in practice, the statute will
still leave opportunities for those confident that they can beat their competitors’
environmental performance without insane expenditures.
Additional cost constraints would limit the statute’s effectiveness, but still leave
scope for significant improvements. The best way to provide an additional cost
constraint would be to make after the fact adjustments if costs prove excessive. An expost approach would make the program respond to actual costs, rather than cost
projections, which often prove inaccurate. This constitutes a substantial advantage. The
adjustments could include suspending the program, putting a price cap on transfer
29
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payments, or limiting the premium paid above the cost of pollution control. All of these
measures, however, would compromise the program’s environmental effectiveness.
A jurisdiction enacting an environmental competition statute must also decide
how to address emissions generated by activities outside the jurisdiction enacting the law.
This concern arises because most markets feature competition across geographic
boundaries. These issues are complicated enough that identifying an industry with
substantial competition solely within a jurisdiction as a target for early experiments with
an Environmental Competition Statute commends itself as a strategy. Under this
approach, only facilities within the regulating jurisdiction could collect fees and only
facilities with that jurisdiction would have to pay. We will see, however, that it is
possible to handle interjurisdictional competition more robustly.
Before describing the interjurisdictional issues and ways of addressing them,
it’s worth noting that traditional environmental law, including emissions trading, faces
similar issues.31 Thus, for example, when EPA required the reformulation of gasoline to
reduce air emissions from cars, effectiveness required that refiners outside the United
States also reformulate their gasoline.32 Otherwise, gasoline from foreign refiners sold in
the United States would undermine the program’s effectiveness. Accordingly, the United
States required foreign refiners to comply.33 Similarly, traditional regulation has to
address transboundary impacts of production facilities’ direct pollution, and usually has
done so by some process of agreements among jurisdictions. Yet, we shall see that these
old issues take a slightly different shape in the context of an Environmental Competition
Statute.
It seems clear that a government has jurisdiction to demand that polluters with its
territory pay polluters with lower emissions, as required by an environmental competition
statute. This jurisdiction would suffice to justify demanding that polluters within the
jurisdiction enacting an Environmental Competition Statute pay polluters outside the
jurisdiction with lower emissions as well as within it. But the question of whether a
jurisdiction may demand payments from polluters outside its jurisdiction to polluters
within the jurisdiction may prove more complex. For example, assume that a petroleum
refinery in California produces carbon dioxide emissions. It competes with refineries in
Texas to sell oil on the interstate market. California might want to force its polluters to
compete to reduce refinery carbon dioxide emissions. This would require that California
law allow Texas refiners to collect fees from California refiners with lower emissions,
which is not jurisdictionally problematic, since the collection would be against a
California facility under California law. But it’s not as clear that California would have
regulatory jurisdiction to demand that Texas refiners pay California refiners with lower
emissions. The same question could arise on the national level. For example, could the
31
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United States demand that Venezuelan refiners pay U.S. refiners with lower emissions
under a U.S. Environmental Competition Statute?
As a general matter, states may tax foreign polluters for activities within the state.
Thus, California, for example, would have jurisdiction to force a Michigan car company
that sells automobiles in California to pay another car company that also sells cars in
California for pollution from the cars driven or sold in California.34 It’s possible that
California could also regulate a company that contributed emissions that affected
California.35 But this category might include any company in the world that emitted
carbon dioxide, so courts might be tempted to limit the reach of such an exercise of
regulatory jurisdiction. In the climate change context emissions everywhere affect any
state’s welfare. Outside of that context, a state might have difficulty regulating facilities
outside this jurisdiction that compete with facilities in the jurisdiction, but emit nothing
that affects the regulating states.36 Either a state or federal government would have to
consider limiting its program to embrace less than the entire market that its companies
compete in under an Environmental Competition Statute. Even with such limitations in
place, such programs would spur a great deal of innovation. And Congress possesses the
authority to remove impediments to state Environmental Competition Statutes arising
from the Dormant Commerce Clause, the source of most of the potential restraints just
mentioned.37
Furthermore, states could reach informal agreements or create interstate compacts
with Congressional approval to broaden the reach of their programs. And nations could
broaden the reach of their programs through treaties.
Both states and federal governments would have to conform their programs to
relevant law encouraging free trade. Nation states must conform to World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), and regional trade
agreement. Similarly, the states in the United States must conform to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, which infers limits on state regulation
and taxation from Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. Under all of
these free trade legal regimes, polities usually may not discriminate against companies
outside their jurisdiction.38 This means that governments must resist the temptation to
34
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make an Environmental Competition Statute a one-way street, absent a very strong
justification.39 If states demand that out-of-state companies with high emissions pay instate companies with low emissions, they must also demand that in-state companies with
high emissions pay out-of-state companies with low emissions. Programs that reach outof-state polluters must be carefully crafted to avoid adverse rulings under free trade law
and to conform to limits on state regulatory jurisdiction.
Many countries prohibit the government from taking private property without just
compensation. In most places, this poses no problem for an environmental competition
statute, because this approach does not involve a government taking of private property.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has created a unique body of law based on
the idea that if government regulation goes “too far” it constitutes a taking triggering a
government compensation duty. Companies would probably challenge this law as a
taking, both in the United States and possible in Canada and Mexico, under the North
American Free Trade Agreement. But this challenge should fail. The Supreme Court has
held that laws requiring monetary transfers without requiring transfer of particular
property do not implicate the takings clause.40 NAFTA tribunals are extremely
unpredictable, but they should not go beyond U.S. law on this, as Canada and Mexico
have no regulatory takings doctrine and there’s no firm support for such a doctrine in the
text of the NAFTA agreement.
A challenge on substantive due process grounds should also fail (a possibility in
the U.S., at least). The U.S. Supreme Court upholds all laws having a mere “rational
basis” under this doctrine. Seeking to advance environmental protection through
competition may be controversial, but it certainly meets the minimal standards for
rationality that govern substantive due process cases.41
While the Court has upheld laws transferring funds from companies to other
private parties, it has struck down an especially unfair retroactive application of one such
law.42 Given the changing composition of the Court and the concern the Court has
expressed about retroactive legislation, designers of Environmental Competition Statutes
might wish to limit the creation of retroactive liability that might appear unfair to the
Court. A simple way to do this is to allow three years after the law goes into effect
before any liability can apply, which sound design demands anyway. This gives those
potentially subject to liability an opportunity to reduce their emissions and thus their
liability, and avoids retroactive liability. After all, the law’s purpose is to stimulate
39
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emission reductions, not payments. The prospect of payments serves only as a means
toward the ends of stimulating competition to clean up.
Conclusion
An Environmental Competition Statute has the capacity to unleash private sector
capacity to improve the environment with little reliance on frequently lethargic
government processes. In this sense it emulates free market dynamics more faithfully
than emissions trading, the signature reform of second generation environmental law. It
allows firms exercising environmental leadership to prosper, thereby discouraging
laggards from resisting change. It can help usher in a more successful third generation of
environmental law.
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